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Abstract
By performing estimation of the regional breakdown of Great Britain’s current and long-term capi-
tal accounts from 1928 through 1931, this paper examines the 1931 balance of payments crisis of
Britain from the perspective of multilateral settlements.
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Introduction
This paper interprets the development of Great Britain’s balance of payments from the
late 1920s through 1931 from the perspective of the multilateral settlements network. The
rapid deterioration of Britain’s balance of payments following the onset of the global Great
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Depression was so serious that Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard in 1931, and
the departure of the pound sterling from gold marked the virtual collapse of the restored inter-
national gold standard. Despite its importance, Britain’s balance of payments crisis in 1931
seems not to have been explored from the viewpoint of the changes in its multilateral settle-
ments. This is probably due to the lack of statistical data relating to Britain’s regional balance
of payments. 
This paper, thus, pays particular attention to the changing pattern of Britain’s regional
basic balance (i.e., the sum of the current account and the long-term capital account, calculat-
ed by region), where the specific regional balances considered are those with the Overseas
British Empire and the non-British Empire, respectively. Among the issues included are: the
pattern of Britain’s multilateral settlements in the 1920s; the deterioration in Britain’s external
payment relationships, by region, during 1928-1931; and the implications of the changes in
Britain’s regional basic balances. In order to examine these problems, estimation is conducted
so as to present a regional breakdown of Britain’s current account and long-term capital
account. Exploration of these questions based on the estimated data highlights some salient
features of Britain’s balance of payments crisis in 1931 from the viewpoint of its regional pay-
ment relationships. 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section I lays the motivational groundwork
for the estimation of regional basic balance in Section II. After discussing Britain’s balance of
payments crisis in 1931 as the underlying force precipitating its departure from the gold stan-
dard, Section I argues that historically the successful working of the pre-1914 international
gold standard broadly rested on the smooth operation of the worldwide multilateral settle-
ments network. This raises the question of whether the collapse of the restored international
gold standard can be attributed to the malfunction of the reestablished network of multilateral
settlements. To verify this assumption in the case of Britain, Section II estimates a regional
breakdown of the basic balance of Britain’s balance of payments. Specifically, after describing
the problems relating to the estimation, estimates are made for Britain’s bilateral balances with
the Overseas British Empire and with the non-British Empire for 1928-1931. Section III then
presents the estimates for Britain’s balances in current and long-term capital accounts with
these two regions in a summarized form, and discusses some salient features of the deteriora-
tion in Britain’s regional basic balance. Furthermore, the characteristics of Britain’s 1931 bal-
ance of payments crisis are explored in the context of global imbalances between the British
Empire and the rest of world.
I  Balance of Payments and Multilateral Settlements
(1) Balance of Payments Crisis as the Underlying Force behind Britain’s Departure
from Gold
Great Britain suspended the convertibility of sterling into gold in September 1931, and
sterling became a floating currency. Within a few months of its departure from gold, many
other countries abandoned gold payments or imposed exchange restrictions, or did both,
although the United States and France remained on gold until 1933 and 1936, respectively.
Since sterling and the U.S. dollar were the key currencies, Britain’s departure from the gold
standard marked the virtual breakdown of the restored international gold standard.
It has been argued in general that the immediate cause of Britain’s going off gold was a
loss of confidence in sterling, which led to a wave of withdrawals of sterling balances (other
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countries’ short-term assets holdings in London) during the summer and early fall of 1931,
resulting in a huge external drain of gold and foreign exchange from Britain. The loss of con-
fidence in sterling is alleged to have been brought about by a chain of disturbing events or
developments beginning in the early summer of 1931. The first was the financial crisis on the
European Continent, in particular the crisis in Germany. Following the German banking crisis
and the consequent abandonment of its gold standard, Britain’s substantial short-term asset
holdings in Germany were frozen. The second development was the deterioration of Britain’s
international short-term investment position. The Macmillan Report published in July 1931
revealed Britain’s position, for the first time, as an international short-term debtor, and sug-
gested that the Bank of England’s reserves were inadequate relative to London’s external
short-term liabilities. The third development was the deterioration in the British government
finances. Budget deficits had continued to increase due to the depression, and the May com-
mittee, worrying about a growing budget deficit, recommended budget austerity in its Report
published in July 1931.  
Each of these developments inevitably contributed to the further weakening of confi-
dence in sterling, and helped provoke the flight from sterling. None of them, however, can be
considered the fundamental cause for the loss of confidence in sterling. The pound was
already weak before the middle of July 1931 (Clarke, 1967, pp.173-177; Cairncross and
Eichengreen 1983, pp.57-58; Moggridge, 1972, pp.139-140). Thus, these developments
should be regarded merely as possible triggers precipitating the attack on sterling, or as factors
accelerating the withdrawals of sterling balances. Instead, the underlying force behind the loss
of confidence in sterling is to be found in the growing deterioration of Britain’s balance of
payments, and particularly in its basic balance. In short, the weakness of sterling, which was
already visible before July 1931, should be attributed to the severe deterioration in the British
external balance.1
As shown in Table 1 in the next Section, Britain’s balance of payments had rapidly wors-
ened since the onset of worldwide Great Depression. Regarding its balance on current
account, the decreasing surplus witnessed between 1928 and 1930 turned in 1931 into a huge
deficit, mainly due to the decline in foreign investment earnings and the widening of the trade
deficit. The basic balance ––– that is, the sum of the balances on current and long-term capital
accounts ––– also deteriorated, moving from small surpluses in 1928 and 1929 to a substantial
deficit in 1931, in spite of the reduction in long-term capital outflows. Moreover, the overall
balance of payments, measured by the change in the stock of gold and foreign exchange held
by the monetary authorities, recorded a substantial deficit in 1931.
Given the situation described above, it was almost impossible for Britain to attract short-
term capital from overseas. Thus, the rapidly growing deficit in Britain’s basic balance can be
considered to have been serious enough to weaken confidence in sterling, as reflected in the
weakness of the sterling exchange rate. This led to concerns about Britain’s ability to maintain
sterling’s convertibility into gold and hence to severe attacks on sterling. The growing deficit
in the basic balance, coupled with large withdrawals of sterling balances caused a massive
drain of gold and foreign exchange from Britain, and resulted eventually in Britain’s abandon-
ment of the gold standard.
(2) Prewar and restored patterns of multilateral settlements
Yoshihiko Hirata
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With regard to the above arguments, it is necessary to examine the relations between
Britain’s balance of payments difficulties from 1929 onward and the great changes in interna-
tional financial relationships during the same period. Of these, the most important is perhaps
the malfunctioning of the worldwide multilateral settlements network reestablished after
World War I. In historic retrospect, the multilateral settlements network had developed into a
distinctive pattern since around the 1870s2. Viewed in a highly simplified form in which the
world is divided into three regions comprising (1) Great Britain, (2) the Overseas British
Empire (i.e., the British Empire excluding Great Britain), and (3) the non-British Empire,
including the United States and the countries of Continental Europe, the pre-1914 pattern of
multilateral settlements can be depicted as follows: in the regional balance of payments
around 1910, Britain had a deficit with the non-British Empire; the latter then had a deficit
with the Overseas British Empire, which in its turn had a deficit with Britain. Therefore,
Britain’s deficit in its balance of all current and financial transactions with the non-British
Empire was settled indirectly by its surplus with the Overseas British Empire, which in turn
had a surplus with the non-British Empire3. Thus, in terms of the international flow of funds,
flows of payment ran as follows: there was a net outflow of funds from Britain to the non-
British Empire; these funds were paid by the non-British Empire to the Overseas British
Empire; then, from the Overseas British Empire these funds moved back to Britain. 
At the center of the pre-1914 multilateral settlements network stood Britain. Its substan-
tial overseas investment played a vital role not only in smoothing the operation of, but also in
developing the system of multilateral settlements. The imbalance between the regions was set-
tled on a multilateral basis through London, largely because most international settlements
were conducted in sterling. In this sense, London was “the greatest international exchange
clearing house in the world” (Williams, 1963, p.513). Viewed from this perspective, it can be
said that the successful working of the classical international gold standard rested on the
smooth functioning of a worldwide network of multilateral settlements.
Both the international gold standard and the multilateral settlement system broke down
with the outbreak of World War I, but were reestablished in the 1920s. Surprisingly, the
restored multilateral settlements network displayed much the same pattern as prevailed before
1914 (Hirata,1982)4. This was in spite of the fact that international trade and monetary rela-
tions in the 1920s were considerably different from those before 1914. Based on the author’s
estimates, it can be inferred that in 1928 Britain’s deficit with the non-British Empire was set-
tled by Britain’s surplus with the Overseas British Empire, which in turn had a surplus with
the non-British Empire. The bilateral balance between the regions is measured here by the
basic balance, and each region’s global basic balance appears to have been very small in 1928,
regardless of whether it was in surplus or deficit.
It should be noted, however, that the restored multilateral settlements network was no
longer centered solely on Britain. It differed significantly in this respect from the pre-war net-
work. In particular, the United States had become the world’s greatest capital exporting coun-
try, replacing Britain in the 1920s. A large amount of international lending by the U.S. was
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(1960, pp.57-60).
4 In the author’s estimates for the restored pattern of worldwide multilateral settlements (Hirata, 1982), the world is
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essential to the smooth functioning of the restored multilateral settlement system. To give a
simple example, capital flows from the United States to Germany enabled the latter to
improve its balance of payments and led to an overall increase in its imports from the rest of
the world. As a result, on aggregate, American investment in Germany enabled the rest of the
world to improve its balance of trade.
Another aspect of these developments was that, while sterling continued to be a key cur-
rency, the U.S. dollar also came to play a key currency role as well. Some portion of interna-
tional settlements were conducted in dollar, and many countries held considerable working
balances in New York (dollar balances) to settle their accounts, as well as in London. It still
seems, however, that the U.S. dollar was not as widely used as sterling during the 1920s in
spite of the fact that the United States was the world’s greatest financial power during the
1920s. Taken as a whole, the restored network of multilateral settlements was thus different
from its predecessor, in that the world’s two principal international capital markets, in New
York and, to a lesser extent, in London, played central roles in its functioning, with both
national currencies used as key currencies.
These considerations raise the question of how the Great Depression affected this multi-
lateral settlements network. It may be assumed that the Great Depression seriously impaired
the functioning of the network. In the case of Great Britain, the rapid and serious deterioration
of Britain’s balance of payments might have been related to a breakdown in its pattern of 
multilateral settlements. In order to verify the validity of such a hypothesis, it is necessary as a
first step to find out how Britain’s bilateral balance of payments with each of its partner coun-
try groups or regions changed between 1928 and 1931. More specifically, when Britain’s
transaction partners are divided into the two broad regions specified earlier, namely the
Overseas British Empire and the non-British Empire, the problem can be re-formulated as fol-
lows: was the deterioration of Britain’s balance-of-payments position from 1928 to 1931
caused by either an increase in the deficit with the non-British Empire or a decline in the sur-
plus with the Overseas British Empire, or by a combination of both? Answering this question
clarify the characteristics of the deterioration of Britain’s balance of payments in the period of
the Great Depression from the viewpoint of the multilateral settlements network. The issue,
however, has not yet been explored, largely due to the lack of statistical data concerning
Britain’s balance of payments by region. For this reason, the next Section will attempt to esti-
mate a regional breakdown of Britain’s current account and long-term capital account between
1928 and 1931.
II  A Breakdown of Britain’s Basic Balance by Region, 1928-1931
(1) Problems with estimation
1) General note on the estimates 
In order to estimate a country’s balance of payments by region, it is necessary to obtain,
in advance, a statement of that country’s global balance of payments, that is, the balance of
payments between that country and the rest of the world. However, the statement of Britain’s
balance of payments with the rest of world during the interwar period published by the Board
of Trade provides only the data on current account, and does not include the transactions on
capital account5. Accordingly, attempts have been made to make up more complete balance of
Yoshihiko Hirata
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payments statistics for Britain which include the requisite figures for the current account and
capital account. These include the estimates by the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(1937), A. E. Kahn (1946), T. C. Chang (1951), and D. E. Moggridge (1972). The most recent
estimates are by R. G. Ware (1974) (a member of staff at the Economic Intelligence
Department of the Bank of England). Table I shows the estimated global balance of payments
of Britain for 1925-1931 produced by Kahn, the Board of Trade, and Ware in summarized
form. The data on the current account in Kahn’s series are taken from those in the Board of
Trade series, and there is no fundamental difference in the trends for current and long-term
capital accounts between the estimates by Kahn and Ware, apart from some details in the
items for various accounts6.
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Table 1  Summary of Balance of Payments of Great Britain, 1925-1931
Notes: 1) The definition of each item is not necessarily the same between the series.  2) For 
merchandise trade balance, the valuation of imports is on c.i.f. basis in both Kahn’s series and the Board 
of Trade series, and on f.o.b. basis on Ware’s series.  3) The data for some types of long-term capital 
transactions not available for each year between 1925 and 1931, and the data for short-term capital 
movements are included in “Errors and Omissions.”  4) “Assistance” in Ware’s series refers to special 
assistance (£ 130 million) from the United States and France, some of which was repaid in 1931.
Sources: Taken from Kahn (1946, Table 13); U.K. Board of Trade (1938, Table No.294); Ware (1974, 
Table B).
6 The trade balance is estimated to be larger in the estimates by the Board of Trade and by Kahn than in those by
Ware, because imports were recorded not c.i.f., but f.o.b. in Ware’s estimates. However, the current account as a whole is
not affected by this difference of approaches.
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Of these estimates, Kahn’s estimates seem the most useful for estimating a regional
breakdown of Britain’s basic balance, partly because only Kahn provides the estimates of
Britain’s bilateral balance in current and long-term capital accounts with the British Empire in
1929 as explained below. Therefore, except where otherwise specified, Kahn’s estimated fig-
ures for balance of payments is adopted as the global balance in this paper to estimate
Britain’s regional basic balance for 1928-1931. 
The period, items in the accounts, and the classification of regions for estimating the
bilateral balance of payments between Britain and individual regions are as follows.
(1) The period covers each year from 1928 to 1931. The year 1928 was a year of relative eco-
nomic stability not only in Britain but also in other parts of the world, and the multilateral
settlements network was functioning smoothly as explained earlier. The year 1931 saw, in
contrast, the deepening of worldwide depression and the collapse of the restored interna-
tional monetary regime.
(2) Estimation is carried out for the following regional balances in various accounts: the trade
balance, the investment income balance, the shipping balance, the other service balances,
and the long-term capital account balance. Needless to say, the first four balances com-
prise the balance on current account, and the sum of the balances on current and long-
term capital accounts is regarded as the basic balance7. Regional breakdowns cannot be
estimated for either the short-term capital account or changes in holdings of reserve assets. 
(3) The world other than Britain is divided into two regions as described earlier: the Overseas
British Empire and the non-British Empire. The former includes the economies classified
as “British countries” in the Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom and the Statistical
Abstract for the British Empire, or those that were later referred to as overseas “British
Commonwealth countries”, such as India, the Dominions, and the British dependencies.
Meanwhile, the most important economies included in the “non-British Empire” region
are the United States and the industrial economies of Continental Europe, although some
primary producing countries are included. Thus, Britain’s bilateral basic balance is to be
estimated with each of these two regions.  
It should be noted that the following estimates are subject to a very large margin of error,
and that the estimated figures are highly approximate. However, it seems fair to say that the
estimates indicate broadly the changing trend of Britain’s current and long-term capital
account surpluses or deficits with the Overseas British Empire and with the non-British
Empire, even though the levels themselves are somewhat unreliable.
2) Kahn’s estimates of Britain’s basic balance by region for 1929
Before proceeding to estimate yearly regional balances on individual items in the current
and long-term capital accounts, it would be pertinent to make up Britain’s basic balance by
region in 1929 based on Kahn’s balance of payments series. As noted above, Alfred E. Kahn
provides estimates of Britain’s bilateral balance with the Overseas British Empire in 1929.
According to these, Britain received from the British Empire “a sum of perhaps ?240 mil-
lion” as its “invisible income” which included investment income of about ?150 million and
shipping income of around ?40 million, and, in addition, ?25 million as a merchandise
export surplus. On long-term capital account, there were new capital issues on the London
Yoshihiko Hirata
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capital market for the Overseas British Empire account of some ?55 million, and repayments
of former loans to the Empire of the order of ?30 million (Kahn, pp.221-222)8. Thus, the
estimates by Kahn indicate that in 1929, with the Overseas British Empire, Britain’s current
account registered a surplus of approximately ?265 million and its basic balance recorded a
surplus of around ?240 million. These figures are given in Table 2.
The data on both Britain’s global balance of payments statistics estimated by Kahn and
its bilateral basic balance with the Overseas British Empire make it possible to calculate
Britain’s basic balance with the non-British Empire. For instance, Britain’s current account
balance with the non-British Empire can be obtained by deducting its current account balance
with the Overseas British Empire from Britain’s global (total) current account balance. The
results of similar calculations are also shown in Table 2. According to this table, in the year
1929 Britain’s basic balance was in deficit with the non-British Empire, while in surplus with
the Overseas British Empire. Measured by basic balance, the surplus with the Overseas
British Empire was used for financing the deficit with the non-British Empire.
The remaining part of this section provides estimates of Britain’s bilateral current and
long-term capital accounts with the Overseas British Empire and with the non-British Empire
for 1928-1931. It also describes estimation procedures. 
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Table 2  Kahn’s Estimate of the Regional Breakdown of Britain’s Basic Balance, 1929
Notes and Sources: 1) The figures in column “Total” are taken from Table 1. The figures marked 
with an asterisk * are the estimated figures by Kahn, taken from Kahn, (1946, pp.221-222). Other 
figures in the table are from the author’s calculations.  2) The figures should be regarded as 
approximate.
?????????????????????? ?????
(2) Estimating a Regional Breakdown of the Current Account 
1) Regional distribution of merchandise trade balance
There is no need to estimate Britain’s merchandise trade balances with the Empire and
the non-Empire (the Overseas British Empire and the non-British Empire are abbreviated to
the Empire and the non-Empire, respectively, in the remainder of this section). The Board of
Trade provides statistical data on British merchandise trade by country in the Statistical
Abstract for the United Kingdom. Table 3 shows the figures for Britain’s exports to and
imports from the Empire and the non-Empire based on the Statistical Abstract (Board of
Trade, 1938, Table No.280 and No.281)9, and from these figures British merchandise trade
balances with each of these two regions can be straightforwardly obtained.
Additional remarks relating to the data are as follows. First, since imports, contrary to
the current practice of valuation, are valued c.i.f., and exports f.o.b., merchandise trade
deficits (surpluses) are overstated (understated) by an amount equivalent to the value of ser-
vices provided by Britain’s shipping and insurance (Foot, p.351; Kahn, p.293). Second, the
figures on trade balances are those based on so-called special trade in merchandise, i.e.,
“exports of produce and manufactures of the U. K.,” and imports retained in the U. K.  Third,
the figures given in Table 3 do not include the trade of silver, which was “almost entirely
entrepôt trade” (Kahn, 1946, p.293). 
As shown in Table 3, Britain continued to maintain the traditional regional pattern of its
merchandise trade balance in the late 1920s. It had a large deficit with the non-Empire region
Yoshihiko Hirata
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Table 3 Britain’s Merchandise Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, by Region, 1928-1931
Note: Exports cover “produce and manufactures” of the U.K. and are valued f.o.b. Imports cover imports 
retained in the U.K. and are valued c.i.f.
Source: U.K. Board of Trade (1938, Tables No.280 and No.281).
9 British Empire countries are grouped under the heading of British Countries in the Statistical Abstract for the United
Kingdom, 82nd Number (1938).
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and a surplus with the Empire region. Yet, the amount of the deficit with the former was much
larger than that of the surplus with the latter. In other words, the offset ratio (the amount of
surplus / the amount of deficit) was just 9% in 1928, and a mere 6% in 1929. Moreover, as
part of the sharp decline in Britain’s merchandise trade from 1929 onwards, the traditional
pattern of Britain’s regional merchandise trade balance began to dissolve: the export surplus in
Britain’s balance with the Empire disappeared and moved instead into deficit. The surplus of
?35 million recorded in 1928 had shifted to a deficit of ?11 million in 1930, and this deficit
expanded significantly to ?45 million in 1931. On the other hand, the deficit in merchandise
trade with the non-Empire fell by ?46 million, from ?407 million in 1929 to ?361 million
in 1931. The key point, however, was that the traditional function of the trade surplus with the
Empire to offset partly the trade deficit with the non-Empire was lost entirely. 
It is of interest to note that the drastic deterioration in Britain’s trade balance with the
Empire resulted mainly from a sharp decline in exports, while the gradual decrease in its trade
deficit with the non-Empire resulted largely from a reduction in imports. Over the period
1929-1931, British exports to the Empire fell by ?154 million to ?171 million, while its
imports from the same region decreased by ?83 million to ?216 million. By contrast,
British exports to the non-Empire declined by ?185 million to ?220 million, while its
imports from the region decreased by ?231 to ?581 million for the same period. As a result,
from the late 1920s to 1931 Britain’s merchandise trade deficit with the rest of world widened
sharply due to a marked deterioration in its trade balance with the Empire region, despite the
decline in its trade deficit with the non-Empire region.
2)  Estimating the regional distribution of investment income 
The income from British investments overseas provided the largest contribution to the
surplus on Britain’s current account, but there are no estimates which provide a regional
breakdown of this income except the estimates for 1929 by Kahn. Although he estimated the
investment income from Empire to be roughly ?150 million for 1929 as noted earlier, he did
not explain his estimation methodology. Therefore it is necessary to estimate the regional dis-
tribution of investment income for each year for the period under consideration. 
In this regard, Sir Robert Kindersley’s series of surveys on British Oversea Investments10
are very helpful, since they include estimates for the regional distribution of income from
some kinds of British overseas investment11. Kindersley estimated British investment income
(interest and dividends) from its overseas investments in 1) securities of central and local gov-
ernments overseas (dominion, colonial and foreign); 2) securities of British companies (i.e.,
companies registered in the U.K.) operating abroad; and 3) securities of foreign and colonial
companies operating abroad. Therefore, his estimates for investment income are classified not
by region but by type of securities. 
However, of the investment income included in the above three categories, income from
loans to governments abroad in the first category, and from investments in overseas railways
in the second and third categories, were estimated according to region. Table 4 shows the
regional investment income (interest and dividends) from overseas investments in govern-
Great Britain’s Balance of Payments Crisis in 1931: A Multilateral Settlements Perspective
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issuing houses and other companies.    
11 Kindersley’s survey does not count certain kinds of income from British overseas investments such as receipts from
holdings of foreign securities not officially dealt in on U.K. markets and certain receipts from private U.K. companies oper-
ating abroad (Kindersley, 1933, p.188; Foot, 1972, p.353). 
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ments and railways for 1929-1931. According to this table, with regard to British investment
income from overseas governments and railways, income earned from the Empire exceeded
that from the non-Empire for each year between 1929 and 1931, and the difference in income
between them tended to widen rapidly during these three years: while the income from the
former remained a little less than ?65 million, the income from the latter fell by 25%, from
?43 million to ?32 million.
Kindersley provides no data on the regional distribution of income from overseas invest-
ments in sectors other than governments and railways. Where investment income lacks a
regional distribution, Kindersley provides estimates of investment income by industry and by
type of company.  These are shown in Table 5.  Many groups of industries classified in
Kindersley’s survey are reclassified broadly into three groups (public utilities, mines and mis-
cellaneous) in this table. For our current purpose of estimating the regional distribution of
income from investments in each of these three groups, a bold assumption is made that there
is a relationship between the investment income from a specific industry group and the out-
standing overseas investments in that industry group. In other words, the share of regional
investment income in total investment income is assumed to be equal to the share of outstand-
ing regional investments in total outstanding investments. 
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Table 4  Income from British Overseas Investments in Governments and Railways,
by Region, 1929-1931
Notes: 1) Based on the surveys by Sir Robert Kindersley. The estimates do not cover the income from 
overseas investments such as individual investments in private companies and investments in foreign 
securities not dealt in on the London market.  2) The income indicates the interest and dividends 
payments made to residents in the U.K.  3) “British companies” refer to companies registered in the U.K. 
“Other companies” refer to foreign and colonial companies registered abroad.
Sources: Based on Kindersley (1932, Tables ?, ?A, ?B, ? and ??; (1933, Tables ?, ? and ??.
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Fortunately, Kindersley produces estimates for British overseas investments, amounting
to ?3,186 million12 by area and by industry group at the end of 1930. His estimates are sum-
marized in Table 6. The corresponding estimates for 1929 and 1931 are not available, but it
might not be unreasonable to assume that the regional share of outstanding overseas invest-
ments in each of industry groups was the same in 1929 and 1931 as it was in 1930. Based on
these assumptions, it is then possible, from the data in Table 5 and Table 6, to calculate the
regional distribution of investment income in each of industry groups (other than railways) for
the years 1929 to 1931. For instance, total investment income of ?11,309 thousand in 1929
from overseas investments in public utilities can be assumed to have been distributed between
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Table 5  Income from British Overseas Investments in Sectors other than
Goverments and Railways, 1929-1931
Notes: 1) Based on the surveys by Sir Robert Kindersley. For the coverage of the estimates, see the notes in Table 
4. 2) I: British Companies (i.e., companies registered in the U.K.) operating abroad. ?: companies both 
registered and operating abroad.  3) Various commercial and industrial groups classified in Kindersley’s survey 
are reclassified into three groups in this table. See the text. 
Sources: Calculated from the data in Kindersley (1932, Tables ?A, ?B, ? and ??; (1933, Tables ? and ??.
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Table 6  Geographical Distribution of British Overseas Investments at the end of 1930
Notes: 1) Estimates by Sir Robert Kindersley. The total amount of ?3,186 million in this table is estimated 
to have accounted for 85% of Britain’s total overseas investments at the end of 1930.  2) “Governments” refer 
to colonial governments and municipalities.
Source: Based on Kindersley (1933,Table ??.
12 According to Kindersley, this figure covered 85% of British outstanding overseas investments at the end of 1930
(Kindersley, 1933, pp.199-200). 
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income of ?4,139 thousand (=11,309?0.366) from the Empire and income of ?7,170 thou-
sand (=11,309?0.634) from the non-Empire. Results from such calculations are presented in
Table 7, in which the estimated regional distribution of income from overseas investment in
each group of public utilities, mines and “miscellaneous” is shown.
Thus, Kindersley’s estimates of Britain’s total income from its overseas investments can
be distributed between income from the Empire and that from the non-Empire. Lines (1)?(5)
in Table 8 shows the regional distribution of investment income from overseas governments
and railways (given in Table 4) together with that from other overseas investments (given in
Table 7) for the years 1929-1931.
However, some problems remain unsolved. The first problem is to adjust Kindersley’s
estimates of investment income so that they can be consistent with Kahn’s. Kindersley’s esti-
mates of total investment income (line C in Table 8) are lower than Kahn’s (line D). Although
the difference between them shows a tendency to decrease (from around ?19 million in the
estimates for 1929 to ?1 million in those for 1931), this narrowing difference does not neces-
sarily reflect higher statistical accuracy in the estimation. The difference between Kindersley’s
and Kahn’s estimates arises largely from the different concepts underlying their estimates and
their different coverage. Kindersley’s estimates, for example, do not count undistributed earn-
ings directly reinvested, nor do they count receipts by Britain’s residents from their overseas
investments in securities not officially dealt in on British markets13. Furthermore, while
Kindersley’s figures were for gross investment income, those of Kahn were for net investment
income in which payments to non-residents on their investments in Britain were deducted. For
these reasons, Kindersley’s figures for total investment income are not comparable to those of
Kahn. 
In spite of this, however, there is no realistic alternative but to use the regional shares of
investment income calculated above (line (7) in Table 8) in order to distribute regionally the
figures for total investment income given by Kahn. The following facts help to justify the use
of this method. First, the income from foreign investments in Britain was evidently much less
than that from British overseas investments14. Second, the amounts reinvested or put to
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Table 7  Estimates of Income from British Overseas Investments in Sectors other than
Governments and Railways, by Region, 1929-1931
Notes and Source: 1) Total investment income (Kindersley series) is taken from Table 5. 2) The 
figures for investment income from the Overseas British Empire and the non-British Empire are 
the author’s estimates. The Estimating procedures are explained in the text.
13 For more details of this difference, see Foot (1972, pp.352-356); Royal Institute of International Affairs (1937,
pp.336-337); League of Nations (1938, pp.186-187).
14 According to Feinstein’s estimates, the ratio of investment income paid abroad to that from abroad was 21% for
1929 and 23% for 1931 (calculated from Feinstein, 1972, Table 38).  
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reserves from profits were assumed to be very small in 1931 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1937, p.336). Thus, Kahn’s figures for total investment income for the years 1929-
1931 can be distributed by region according to the estimated regional shares indicated in line
A (7) of Table 8. For example, investment income from the Empire in 1929 is estimated to
have been ?150 million (=250?0.601). The results are shown in line D of this table. The fig-
ures in this line are subject to a large margin of error15, but, surprisingly, the amount of invest-
ment income from the Empire (?150 million) for 1929 estimated here by the author is the
same as that estimated by Kahn (see Table 2).
The second problem is how to estimate the regional distribution of investment income
for 1928. Kindersley provided for 1928 only the estimated regional distribution of income
from British overseas investments in government securities, making no estimate of investment
income from other sectors. According to Kindersley’s estimates, total investment income from
overseas governments amounted to ?61.9 million for 1928, of which ?43.8 million were
from the Empire and ?18.1 million from the non-Empire (Kindersley, 1931, Table II). If the
figure of ?61.9 million is deducted from the total investment income (?250 million) given
in Kahn’s series, investment income other than that from overseas governments will be overes-
timated. The reason for this is that, as already explained, total investment income in Kahn’s
series exceeds total identified investment income in Kindersley’s series, for example by 21%
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Table 8  Estimates of Britain’s Investment Income, by Region, 1929-1931
Notes and Sources: 1) The data in lines (1) and (2) are from Table 4. The investment income data in 
lines (3), (4) and (5) are from Table 7.  2) The data in line (8) are for the investment income not covered 
or identified by above ( calculated from the data in Kindersley, 1932, Table ?, Table ?; 1933, Table V, 
and Table ? ).  3) “Adjusted investment income” in line (10) refers to investment income adjusted to 
balance of payments basis. The total investment income data in line (10) are derived from Kahn’s series 
of balance of payments (Table 1). The data for regional distribution of investment income in line (10) 
are based on the author’s estimates. The estimating procedures are described in the text. For the 
regional distribution of adjusted investment income for 1928, see the text.
15 Since the United States and some industrial countries in Continental Europe seem to have accounted for a large por-
tion of the outstanding investments in Britain at the time under review, investment income from the non-Empire might be
overestimated.
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for 1929 (Table 8).  
Assuming the rate of excess for 1928 to be the same as for 1929, total investment
income from overseas governments is adjusted to ?75 million (=?61.9?1.2), of which
?53 million are from the Empire and ?22 million from the non-Empire. Since ?75 million
is thus attributed to income from overseas governments, the remaining ?175 million (=250-
75) can be regarded as income from overseas investments other than those in government
securities in Kahn’s series. The regional distribution for the remaining figures can be estimat-
ed according to regional shares of outstanding overseas investments in the sectors other than
governments. The regional shares of outstanding overseas investments in these sectors are
51.5%{=(354+63+92+391) / (788+172+118+668)} for the Empire and 48.5% for the non-
Empire (calculated from the data in Table 6). Based on these shares, the remaining income of
?175 million can be distributed as income from the Empire (?90 million), and income from
the non-Empire (?85 million). Thus, the total investment income of ?250 million for 1928
in Kahn’s series can be broken down by region: investment income from the Empire and the
non-Empire is estimated to have been ?143 million (=53+90) and ?107 million (=22+85),
respectively.
Table 9 summarizes the resulting estimates for the regional distribution of total invest-
ment income for the years 1928-1931 in Kahn’s series of balance of payments.  According to
this table, total British income from overseas investments declined significantly by 32%, from
an annual average of ?250 million in 1928-1929 to ?170 million in 1931. The rate of
decline in investment income from the non-Empire was larger than that from the Empire.
From 1929 to 1931, investment income from the non-Empire fell by 37%, compared with
28% from the Empire. However, in terms of absolute amounts, the decrease in the latter
amounted to ?43 million against ?37 million in the former.
3)  Estimating the regional distribution of balances on other items 
The various items in the current account excluding merchandise trade and investment
income in Kahn’s series are grouped in this paper under two headings: (1) net shipping
income and (2) other services. Net shipping income is in the main the balance between gross
earnings by British shipping and British payments to foreign shipping. Under “other services”
are included “short interest and commissions,” “government transactions” and “other
receipts.” The figures for balances on these items in Kahn’s series of balance of payments are
taken from the Board of Trade series ( Kahn, 1946, Table 13; Board of Trade, 1938, Table No.
294). 
It is almost impossible to distribute the balances on these items by region. With regard to
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Table 9  Estimates of Investment Income in Britain’s Balance of
Payments, by Region, 1929-1931
Sources: 1) The data for “Total” for each year are derived from investment income in Kahn’s series 
of balance of payments in Table 1.  2) The data for regional distribution for 1929-1931 are taken 
from Table 8. For 1928, the data are from the text, pp.116-117.
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shipping income, it can be observed that the income from the Empire seems to have declined
more than that from the non-Empire, largely because the reduction in Britain’s merchandise
exports to the Empire was larger than to the non-Empire for 1928-1931, while at the same
time British shipping was used in a larger share of its trade with the Empire. However, there
are no further clues to help in estimating the regional allocation of shipping income.
Moreover, earnings by British shipping from transport between third countries appear to have
been huge, but are impossible to allocate regionally. The same may be said of the items
grouped under “other services.”16
Kahn estimated the shipping income from the Empire to have been roughly ?40 mil-
lion, accounting for 31% of total shipping income, while “other services” income from the
Empire accounted for around ?50 million, some 48% of the total for 1929 (Table 2). Our cur-
rent estimation of the regional distribution of shipping income and income from “other ser-
vices” for 1928 and 1930-1931 makes use of these percentage shares: the estimates are made
based on the crude assumption that, for example, the share of shipping income from the
Empire for the year 1928 and 1930-1931 was the same as in 1929. The figures obtained in this
way for the regional breakdown of shipping income and of “other services” incom are entered
into the subsequent table12 which shows the regional distribution of Britain’s basic balance.
(3)  Estimating a Regional Breakdown of the Long-term Capital Account
The long-term capital account in Kahn’s balance of payments series consists of “new
overseas issues” in the London market, “capital repayments” and “other long-term capital
movements.” Among the items in the long-term capital account, “other long-term capital
movements” refer to transactions in outstanding securities, direct investments etc., but there
are no estimates for them for 1928-1929. Moreover, transactions involving existing securities
are often short-term investments (Lary, 1942, pp.106-107). For these reasons, no estimate of
the regional breakdown is made for “other long-term capital movements.”
1)  Regional distribution of new overseas issues
The data for total new overseas issues in Kahn’s series for 1928 are taken from Midland
Bank’s estimates, while those for 1929-1931 are taken from Kindersley’s estimates. The esti-
mates by Midland Bank for new issues for overseas account cover all capital issues floated in
London excluding those for refunding, and take no account of subscriptions to new issues by
overseas residents (Midland Bank, 1932, p.4; Royal Institute of International Affairs,1937,
p.338). On the other hand, the estimates by Kindersley are based on those by Midland Bank,
but are adjusted to include refunding issues and to exclude the amount subscribed by non-res-
idents (Kindersley, 1932, p.194; 1933, pp.202-203). From a balance-of-payments point of
view, Kindersley’s estimates are more suitable than those of Midland Bank. However, the esti-
mates by Midland Bank are very useful, because, in contrast to Kindersley’s estimates, the
Midland Bank series includes the geographical distribution of the overseas capital issues and
covers each year during the 1928-1931 period. The quantitative difference between these two
estimates is not so large as to affect the basic trend of new overseas issues (see Table 10). For
this reason, the new capital issues in the Midland Bank series are adopted in the subsequent
table for Britain’s regional basic balance.
Great Britain’s Balance of Payments Crisis in 1931: A Multilateral Settlements Perspective
118
16 Each item in “other services” is made up of different varieties of external service transactions. For example, “short
interest and commissions” include commission on acceptance credit, discount on foreign bills, interest on banks’ short-term
deposits and liabilities, insurance remittances from abroad, etc.” (Foot, 1972, p.356). 
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Table 10 shows the regional distribution of capital issues for overseas accounts between
1928 and 1931. According to this table, the total amount of new overseas issues on the
London market declined sharply (by 34%) to ?94 million in 1929, after recording ?143 mil-
lion in 1928, its highest level since World War 1 (Midland Bank, 1930, p.7). Overseas issues
recovered to some extent in 1930, but contracted again by almost 58% in 1931 compared with
the previous year. In the course of this sharp reduction in overseas issues, the regional distri-
bution of overseas issues also changed. The Empire’s share of total issues for overseas
accounts rose from around 60% in 1928 to 80% in 1931. This reflected the fact that in the
same period the issues for non-Empire accounts decreased more significantly than those for
Empire accounts.
2)  Estimating the regional distribution of capital repayments
The data in the item “capital repayments” in Kahn’s balance of payments series are taken
from Kindersley’s estimates of capital repayments. Kindersley’s estimates for repayments are
principally made by type of borrower, i.e., overseas “governments,” “British companies oper-
ating abroad” and “companies registered abroad.”  Kindersley, therefore, makes no attempt to
estimate the regional distribution of (total) capital repayments by borrowers with the excep-
tion of the repayments by overseas governments and railways. The procedures adopted here to
estimate the regional distribution of capital repayments by other sectors (“public utilities,”
“mines” and “miscellaneous”) for the years 1929-1931 are the same as those adopted for esti-
mating the investment income by region for the same years. The results of calculations made
according to these procedures are shown in lines (5), (8) and (11) in Table 11. Line (14) in this
table shows the estimated regional distribution of the total capital repayments for 1929-1931.
It should be noted that the figure for repayments by the Empire is estimated here to have been
?30.7 million in 1929 (see last line in Table 12), against roughly ?30 million according to
Kahn’s estimate (Table 1).
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Table 10  New Overseas Capital Issues in the London Market, by Region, 1929-1931
Notes and Sources: 1) The data for?and? are taken from Midland Bank (1932, pp.3-5). 
The estimates exclude the issues for the purpose of conversion or redemption. “Public 
authorities” refer to governments, municipalities and public boards. 2) Kinderslry’s estimates of 
new overseas issues (Kindersley, 1933, p.204) include refunding issues, but exclude subscriptions 
to new issues by non-U.K. residents.
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In Kindersley’s survey for the year 1928, estimates for the regional distribution of capital
repayments are confined only to repayments by overseas governments. Here, in order to esti-
mate the regional distribution of other capital repayments, the same procedure is used as for
calculating the investment income by region for 1928. According to this procedure, repay-
ments for 1928 can be estimated to have been some ?15 million from the Empire and around
?20 million from the non-Empire.17
As shown in Table 11, there was a significant reduction in capital repayments from 1930
to 1931 partly due to an increase in defaults on loans abroad (Kindersley, 1934, p.369).
Furthermore, reduced repayments by both governments and non-government sectors in the
Empire region accounted for a large portion of the decline in total repayments in this period. 
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Table 11  Estimates for Britains’s Receipts of Capital Repayments,
by Region, 1929-1931
Notes and Sources: 1) The data in lines (1),(3) and (4) are taken from Kindersley (1932, Table?, Table ?
and Table ?? ; (1933, Table ?, Table ? and Table ??.  2) The data for total repayments in lines 
(6),(7),(9),(10),(12) and (13) are from Kindersley (1932, Table ? and Table ?? ; (1933, Table ? and  
Table ??.?For definition of  ? and ?, see the notes in Table 5. 3) The data for regional distribution in lines 
(5)?(14) are author’s estimates. The procedures for the estimation are explained in the text.
Total Repayments
17 Kindersley estimates that, of the total capital repayments of £15 million by overseas governments for 1928, £5
million were from the Empire and £10 million from the non-Empire (Kindersley, 1932, Table II C). Since the total amount
of repayments by all the overseas borrowers is estimated to have been £35 million for 1928 in Kahn’s series (Table 1), the
remaining £20 million is estimated to have been presumably repaid by non-government sectors. This £20 million is dis-
tributed between the Empire and the non-Empire according to the procedure described in the text. The resulting repayments
from these regions are estimated to be £10 million each. Thus, the total repayments by the Empire and the non-Empire for
1928 are estimated to have been £15 million and £20 million, respectively. These figures are entered in Table 12.
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III  Estimation Results and their Implications
(1) Regional Breakdown of Britain’s Basic Balance and Changing Aspects of its
Multilateral Settlements  
Table 12 summarizes the results of the estimations detailed in the preceding Section:
presented in this table are the estimates of Britain’s regional basic balances with the Overseas
Empire and the non-British Empire for the years 1928-1931. The balances for individual items
in the current and long-term capital accounts by region are also indicated. The arrangement of
individual items is based on conventional usage and the item “investment income” is included
under the item “services.” It should be noted again that there remains sizable uncertainty
about the accuracy of the regional figures, largely because most estimates of regional balances
on individual items had to be made based on somewhat ad hoc assumptions. Despite their
highly approximate nature, the estimates in the table can be seen as offering a broad indication
of the changes in Britain’s basic balances with both the Overseas Empire and the non-British
Empire during the period 1928-1931.
The table allows us to remark on some salient features of the development of Britain’s
regional basic balance from 1929 onward. First, by 1928 Britain had restored the pre-1914
pattern of multilateral settlements in its international economic relations.   As explained earli-
er, the pre-war worldwide network of multilateral settlements which had developed since the
1870s collapsed with the onset of World War 1, but, probably around the middle of the 1920s,
was reestablished in much the same pattern as had prevailed in the pre-war period. Thus,
Britain was once again settling its bilateral imbalances in a multilateral manner. In 1928, mea-
sured at the level of the basic balance (i.e., the combined balances on current and long-term
capital accounts), Britain had a deficit of roughly ?180 million with the non-British Empire,
in which are included the United States and major industrial countries on the European
Continent. On the other hand, Britain had a surplus of about ?190 million with the Overseas
British Empire, comprising countries mostly characterized as primary producing exporters.
From Britain’s point of view, its bilateral imbalance with each of these regions was settled in a
multilateral manner: the deficit with the non-British Empire was settled by the surplus with
the Overseas British Empire, and, as a result, Britain’s basic balance with the rest of world was
approximately in “equilibrium” in 1928.
Second, with the deepening of the worldwide depression, Britain’s basic balance with
both the Overseas British Empire and the non-British Empire tended to deteriorate. While the
surplus on basic balance with the Overseas British Empire declined by just over ?100 mil-
lion, from roughly ?190 million in 1928 to approximately ?90 million in 1931, the deficit
with the non-British Empire widened for the same period by about ?30 million, growing to
roughly ?210 million. As a result, Britain’s global basic balance shifted from a situation
approximately “in balance” to a record deficit of some ?120 million. 
In this connection, the following points should be emphasized. 1) The sharp deteriora-
tion of Britain’s basic balance between 1928 and 1931 was mainly due to the significant
decrease in the surplus with the Overseas British Empire. Of the deterioration in Britain’s
global basic balance of some ?135 million for 1928-1931, nearly 80% was accounted for by
the contraction in the surplus with the Empire. 2) The ratio of Britain’s deficit on basic bal-
ance with the non-British Empire covered by its surplus with the Overseas British Empire
tended to decline rapidly from 1929 onward. For 1929 Britain’s deficit with the non-British
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Empire was more than offset by its surplus with the Overseas British Empire, but for the year
1931 when Britain abandoned the gold standard, its surplus with the Overseas British Empire
offset only 42% of its deficit with the non-British Empire. Thus, from the multilateral settle-
ment point of view, this means that Britain’s pattern of international settlements on a multi-
lateral basis came to be undermined. It would be no exaggeration to say that, viewed in the
level of the basic balance, the restored pattern of Britain’s multilateral settlements broke down
in the course of global Great Depression. 
Third, the factors contributing to the deterioration in Britain’s basic balance with the
Overseas British Empire differed significantly from those with the non-British Empire.  This
can be verified from Table 12. With the Overseas British Empire, Britain had a surplus on cur-
rent account in 1928 as before, the magnitude of which more than offset the deficits on its
long-term capital account, thus leaving a surplus on its basic balance of nearly ?200 million.
However, between 1928 and 1931 Britain’s basic balance surplus with the Overseas British
Empire, despite the improvement of the balance on long-term capital account, is estimated to
have decreased by just over ?100 million, falling to around ?90 million in 1931. Therefore,
a large and rapid shrinkage in Britain’s current account surplus with the Empire caused its
basic balance surplus with the Empire to decline significantly during 1928-1931. The shift
from surplus to deficit in merchandise trade and the decrease in investment income receipts
were the major factors behind the deterioration in Britain’s current account with the Overseas
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Table 12  Estimates of the Regional Breakdown of Britain’s Basic Balance, 1928-1931
Note: Most of the estimated data are subject to a wide margin of error. See the text. 
Sources: 1) The data for “merchandise trade” are from Table 3.  2) The data for “investment income” are from 
Table 9.  3) The data for “shipping” and “Other services” are calculated according to the procedures explained in 
the text p.118.  4) The data for “new capital issues” are taken from Table 10.  5) The data for “repayments” for 
1929-1931 are from Table 11. Estimates for 1928 are from footnote 17 in the text.  4) The data for “gold 
movements” are taken from U.K. Board of Trade (1938, Table No.290).
Services
With the Non-British Empire
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Empire. Of the overall shrinkage of some ?150 million in its current account surplus with the
Empire, the deterioration in merchandise trade balance accounted for 53%, while the decrease
in investment income accounted for 25%.
On the other hand, with the non-British Empire, Britain had a deficit on its merchandise
trade as well as its long-term capital account, although there was a surplus on its service
account. For the year 1928, since the service account surplus covered less than 60% of the
combined deficits on merchandise trade and long-term capital accounts, Britain’s basic bal-
ance with the non-British Empire was in deficit amounting to around ?180 million.
Following the onset of the depression in 1929, Britain’s basic balance deficit with the non-
British Empire widened to roughly ?210 million in 1931. The widening deficit with the non-
British Empire was contributed to by a large decrease of around ?100 million in Britain’s
surplus on non-merchandise current transactions such as the receipts of investment income
and shipping. As for other transactions with the non-British Empire, the deficit in Britain’s
long-term capital account shifted to a slight surplus due mainly to the sharp reduction in capi-
tal issues for non-British Empire accounts in the London market, while, at the same time, the
deficit in its merchandise trade balance declined to a small extent. However, the effect of these
factors improving Britain’s basic balance was not large enough to prevent the basic balance
with the non-British Empire from deteriorating overall. Thus, the growing deficit in Britain’s
basic balance with the non-British Empire for 1928-1931 was attributable to the decline in its
service trade surplus being larger than the improvement in the combined balances on mer-
chandise trade and long-term capital accounts.
(2) A Multilateral Settelements Perspective on the Deterioration in Britain’s
External Account
Broadly, the above analysis reveals that the serious deterioration in Britain’s basic bal-
ance during 1930-1931 was due largely to the sharp decline in its basic balance surplus with
the Overseas British Empire rather than the increasing deficit with the non-British Empire.
Consequently, in 1931 the ratio of the surplus with the Overseas British Empire to the deficit
with the non-British Empire declined to merely 42% compared with some 100% in 1928.
These facts explain how Britain’s restored pattern of multilateral settlements broke down in
the face of global depression.
The defining characteristics of this collapse will be made clearer by viewing the changes
that took place in the bilateral basic balance between the Overseas British Empire and the
non-British Empire. There is, unfortunately, no statistical data available for verifying the
changing bilateral balance between these two regions. However, it seems evident that the
Overseas British Empire’s basic balance with the non-British Empire deteriorated from the
late 1920s through the early 1930s. The author’s preliminary and very rough estimates, which
are, of course, subject to a large margin of error, indicate a serious deterioration in the
Overseas British Empire’s current account balance with the non-British Empire between 1928
and 1931. The Overseas British Empire’s balance on current account – not including gold
movements – with the non-British Empire is estimated to have shifted from a surplus of
around ?125 million in 1928 to a deficit of some ?30 million in 1930 and ?50 million
in193118, although the estimated figures might overstate the deterioration. Since the long-term
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18 These figures can be roughly estimated by deducting the Overseas British Empire’s current account balance with
Britain (see the data in Table 12, with sign reversed) fron its global current account balance. Annual data on the latter are
from Hirata (1988, Table 2-19) and the author’s revised estimates based on the figures given in United Nations (1949,
Table 3); League of Nations (1933, p.117); Bank for International Settlements (1953, p.28); The Economist (Aug. 6, 1938,
p.280); Williams (1963, p.521).
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capital movements between these regions appear to have been small, the extent of the deterio-
ration in the Overseas British Empire’s basic balance with the non-Empire can be reasonably
approximated as the change estimated on the current account balance.
From the viewpoint of the Overseas British Empire, the shift in its basic balance with the
non-British Empire from surplus to deficit meant the complete collapse of its multilateral 
payment pattern. In 1928, the Overseas Empire’s deficit with Britain (Table 12) could be more
or less settled by its surplus with the non-British Empire and by its normal exports of gold.
However, in 1930 and 1931, the Overseas British Empire added substantial deficits with the
non-British Empire to its existing deficit with Britain. This development suggests that the
decrease in the region’s basic balance deficit with Britain reflected the result of some adjust-
ment to the growig deterioration in its basic balance with the non-British Empire. Meanwhile,
the sharp deterioration of its basic balance with the non-British Empire was attributable 
largely to a significant decline of merchandise exports along with the cessation of long-tem
capital inflows from outside the Empire.
Viewed in these ways, Britain’s balance of payments crisis in the early 1930s can be
characterized as follows. First, as discussed above, the serious deterioration in Britain’s basic
balance from a surplus in 1928-1929 to a huge deficit in 1931 was caused both by a rapid
decline in its surplus with the Overseas British Empire and by a gradual increase in its deficit
with the non-British Empire. From a multilateral payments point of view, this change in
Britain’s regional basic balance revealed the collapse of the traditional pattern of Britain’s
multilateral settlements. At the same time, this breakdown was closely related to a similar
foundering of multilateral settlements pattern of the Overseas British Empire. Measured by
basic balance, the restored multilateral settlements pattern, as discussed earlier, worked
smoothly based on payment relationships in which Britain’s deficit with the non-British
Empire was settled by its surplus with the Overseas British Empire, and, in turn, the Overseas
British Empire’s deficit with Britain was settled by its surplus with the non-British Empire.
However, in the crisis years after 1929, the bilateral imbalances between these major regions
could no longer be settled on this multilateral basis. 
For the British Empire as a whole, 1) the Overseas British Empire’s pattern of multi-
lateral settlement collapsed due to the shift from surplus to deficit with the non-British
Empire. 2) This shift then led the Overseas British Empire to reduce its deficit with Britain. 3)
Both Britain’s decreasing surplus with the Overseas British Empire and its growing deficit
with the non-British Empire led to a surging deficit on Britain’s global basic balance. In this
sense, Britain’s increasing basic balance deficit was affected indirectly by the deterioration of
the Overseas British Empire’s basic balance with the non-British Empire.
Second, in both 1930 and 1931, while Britain was faced with the serious problem of how
to settle the huge deficit in its basic balance, the burden of financing a large deficit in the
Overseas British Empire’s basic balance was in part placed on Britain. Although the Overseas
British Empire’s deficit on its basic balance was partly financed by methods such as gold
exports and short-term borrowings in London (Williams, 1963, p.522), ultimately the remain-
der needed to be financed by drawing on London funds (sterling balances) held by banks and
governments in the Overseas Empire. According to Nurkse, “central foreign exchange
reserves” held by Australia, the Union of South Africa and India decreased by about ?32 mil-
lion, to around ?40 million from the end of 1929 through 1931 (Nurkse, 1944, Appendix III).
With the exception of gold exports, the above methods of deficit financing would be factors
not only worsening Britain’s overall balance of payments but also intensifying the pressure on
the sterling exchange rate.
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Third, as suggested above, the marked deterioration in Britain’s external balance from
the late 1920s to the early 1930s closely reflected the global imbalances between the British
Empire and the non-British Empire. Based on data compiled by the author, the consolidated
balance on current account for the British Empire as a whole19 is broadly estimated to have
moved from a surplus of some ?35 million in 1928 to a deficit of roughly ?150 million in
1931 (see footnote 18). These figures might be overestimated, but it is evident that, for several
years preceding the British departure from the gold standard, there was rapid growth in the
global current account imbalances between the British Empire and the rest of the world. In
this sense, the floating of sterling, the formation of the “sterling bloc” and the institution of
Empire tariff preference following the British departure from gold may reasonably be regard-
ed as the means by which the British Empire sought to correct its growing imbalances with
the non-British Empire countries as a whole.
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